of legal meaning despite the recognition that the usual standard of legal modern sovereignty does not apply anymore. However, this is not a radical pluralist theory for at least two reasons. It aims at rationalizing the status quo (rectius, to provide the most accurate framework for understanding legal reality), not at transforming it. Moreover, pluralism is portrayed as an instrumental value and not a normative one 13 , which means that pluralism serves the aim of integration and not viceversa. 13 Here lies the main difference between constitutional and legal pluralism: the latter recognizes pluralism as an intrinsic value. For a recent and excellent overview of pluralist theories see E. Melissaris, Ubiquitous Law, London, Ashgate,
should not pass unnoticed that it also purports to explain pluralism as the best institutional mechanism to protect fundamental rights. Given this scenario, this theory might be improved by adding other elements into the framework. On a descriptive level, it should take into account actors other than courts. Otherwise, it would lose, at least partially, its explanatory force.
Also, while seemingly workable, it should, on a normative level, answer the question of whence its principles draw their legally binding force from. The pluralists view seems to take for granted that the principle of proportionality and an agreement on general principles are sufficient to ground the protection of fundamental rights. At this stage, one of the problems, as we shall see, lies in resorting to the idea of judicial dialogue as an alternative way of tracking public interests.
Furthermore, constitutionalism is grounded on the very idea of proportionality and balancing becomes the best solution to deal with conflict of rights. But if one admits, as the pluralists do, that the legal meanings in the European legal space cannot be always imposed ex alto, then it is also necessary to recognize that European law is shaped through multiple interactions of many and different institutions.
In order to show these weak spots of the pluralists" discourse, I will proceed as follows. In the second and third paragraphs, two of the most influential theories offered by constitutional pluralists (Mattias Kumm and Miguel Maduro) will be examined and evaluated against the background of a republican conception of the common good. The main difference between these two versions is to be found at the level of principles: both advocate the necessity of certain constitutional (meta)principles, but they do not share the same list of principles. In any case, this principled aspect seems to challenge the idea that pluralism, as some authors fear, won"t cease «to pose demands on the world» 14 , leaving the societal forces free to determine the outcome of any kind of institutional conflict. Among the things that are worth being outlined, an inquiry into these two proposals will
show that, despite they claim to be pluralists, they are not ready to take into full account the consequences of epistemic pluralism. Indeed, in this shape, constitutional pluralism betrays a bias in favor of judicial power and the risk, always inherent to these kinds of theories, of favoring a strong centripetal drive. As already remarked, there are technical and practical reasons behind this idea:
first, the formal channel of communication between the Luxembourg Court and the national States is constituted by the preliminary reference procedure; second, the historical role played by the 15 See the classic account of E. Stein, Lawyers, "Judges and the Making of a Transnational Constitution", American mono-institutional approach may prove to be in contradiction with the premises which constitute the pluralists" agenda. It strikes as contradictory to support epistemic pluralism and at the same times take for granted that constitutional courts have the monopoly of national constitutional meanings. Interestingly, once taken in a less judicial fashion, pluralism may provide some useful insights on how complex is the relationship between courts and political institutions in the European legal realm. At this level, the normative and the explanatory properties of constitutional pluralism may prove appropriate for understanding the implications of a wider and, indeed, more pluralistic perspective on the relation between national and supranational authorities. In the last paragraph, since the pluralists are still concerned mainly with the judicial process and they rely on an exclusively output-related approach to legitimacy, they are not able to put forward an autonomous and sufficient proposal for tracking and defining European common goods. In fact, they do not take into account the so-called circumstances of politics 16 and the relevance of input reasons in the tracking of common goods. Indeed, if this is the context in which pluralism has developed, then the task for the European constitutional theorist consists in providing constitutional criteria and/or principles which may keep together, on the one hand, the idea of multiple sites of authority and, on the other hand, the meaningfulness of the constitutional discourse for the EU.
The Primacy of Proportionality: Mattias Kumm's Conflict Rules
Mattias Kumm is certainly one of the most sophisticated supporters of the idea of constitutional pluralism and, at the same time, a proponent of the legitimacy of strong judicial review. His reflection on the topic, as is true for other constitutional pluralists, has been triggered by the Maastricht judgment 17 . The core of Kumm"s pluralism can indeed be individuated in a jurisprudence of constitutional conflict which should contribute to the maintenance of coherence within the European legal order 18 .
In a series of articles, Kumm has developed a theory for explaining and justifying the current state of affairs of the European Union, a state which may be described with a paraphrase of the words of The Federalist: neither federal nor national, but a composition of both 19 . As already said, 9 previously enucleated. It also presupposes the ability of a national court to disregard EU Law when its provisions find no reflection in national constitutional norms and, in case of explicit contrast, no interpretive effort can possibly save the conflict. This is an interpretive device that allows the developing of a coherent European Legal order as long as inviolable national constitutional principles are in danger or violated. The role of pluralism becomes apparent: it helps EU constitutional law to flourish by posing some constraints. It also capitalizes on a practice of some constitutional courts to remain loyal to the founding principles of their own national constitution. were simply to discriminate against a politically or socially disfavoured group of people, then the law would fail this test and should be struck down. The second step concerns the suitability of the means envisaged by the law in order to achieve its aim. If the means are clearly unrelated to the aim, then again, the law cannot pass the test. The third step implies an inquiry into possible alternative ways for achieving the same end that are less restrictive of the rights of those negatively affected by the law and that is, at the same time, equally effective and equally cost-effective for the State. Finally, step four is to be considered as proportionality stricto sensu. This step is indeed the so-called "balancing test", which reads: "the greater the degree of non-satisfaction of, or detriment to, one principle, the greater must be the importance of satisfying the other" 30 . In other words, the restrictions on the rights of those who are negatively affected must not be disproportionate with respect to the value of the legitimate aim that would justify the law. Going further, this balancing should be performed in three phases: first, establishing the degree of non-satisfaction, or of detriment to a first principle (intensity of the infringement); second, establishing the importance of satisfying the competing principle; third, establishing whether the importance of satisfying the latter principle justifies the detriment to or non-satisfaction of the former (evaluation) 31 .
According to Kumm, if properly understood, balancing is performed paying great attention to the judgments of the legislature whose law is under examination 32 . A law will be found collective agreement containing terms that were more favourable than those laid down in the relevant legislation. In these cases the starting point of the Court"s argument has been that the right to strike is conditional on the satisfaction of the proportionality test. This directs courts to consider whether there was any other form of action open to the unions which would have been less restrictive of the employer"s free movement rights. But the point of the practice of industrial action is to cause harm to the employer because otherwise it won"t be really effective in persuading it to make concessions 38 . For this reason, it does not look promising to assess the right to strike with the tools of proportionality analysis. As it has been noted, usually the proportionality test is commonly used as a way of assessing the state"s limitations on the right to strike […] However, in Viking and Laval, the right to strike is not the starting point for the analysis. Instead, the ECJ"s reasoning begins with the employer"s assertion of its free movement rights [..] Thus, it s the union"s industrial action which must pursue a legitimate aim and which must
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve that aim 39 .
Therefore, in Laval the Court considered that industrial action as blockading of sites constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services which is disproportionate with regard to the public interest. The suspicion is that we are not witnessing an ordinary balancing but rather a structural imbalance 40 , other than a re-interpretation of Treaty provisions that is "marking a substantial hierarchy between economic and social rights" 41 .
It is clear that the preponderant focus on the work of courts cannot put into question some of the unchallenged assumptions on which is based a case like 42 Not to mention the fact that if it is the court that identifies the relevant interests, then why should the interests of the parties before the court be privileged over the interests of others equally affected by the outcome of the decision? 43 On the general difficulty even for democratic theory to set normative criteria for the definition of common goods see complicated when proportionality analysis is performed outside the framework of the constitutional State. In the latter case, to the question on the standard according to which one is supposed to measure the optimization of rights or principles, one may respond, as Alexy puts it, somehow elusively, "the constitutional point of view"
45 . The point is that the meaning of this constitutional point of view, at least in Europe, is far from being clear.
Another controversial aspect of the proportionality analysis should be mentioned. In the case of Laval, the ECJ did not take properly into account the peculiar structure of the Scandinavian social model and therefore questioned the state"s failure to regulate the collective bargaining process on which it was relying for full implementation of the Posted Workers Directive 46 . Clearly, it would have been unrealistic to ask to the Court to assess and take into consideration all the aspects linked to the peculiar Scandinavian social model involved in the litigation. And this is due to the fact that, the principle of proportionality, as it stands today, does not give a voice to all the parties involved 47 . To put it more accurately, proportionality and the law of balancing appear to be conceived within a pre-constituted framework which sets the content of fundamental rights without taking into account the disagreement on the same rights. 50 It seems that for Kumm constitutionalism is mainly rationality. This is why its principles may be recognized by a competent organ even in the case they had not been enacted.
themselves" decide political questions, whereas decisions of duly appointed judges are cast as platonic guardians imposing their will on the people 51 .
It is possible to think of multiple sites where to articulate the will of the people and this is usually the task of the principles of representation and separation of powers. However, in this passage one can detect also a serious misunderstanding of modern democratic politics. Kumm is reacting against political constitutionalists of the British and American kind 52 , and in particular he wants to undermine their institutional preference for the role of parliaments. He believes that by weakening the link between the people and parliament he can reject political constitutionalism. If one admits that representative democracy is a second best solution because it precludes the people from directly deciding, so goes the argument, then it becomes also legitimate the role of an institution like a constitutional court which is equally distant from the people. But this move proves to be too quick. In fact, there is no strict connection between the claim that the people cannot be properly represented by any single institution and the claim that what is normatively relevant for contemporary constitutionalism should not be determined by the will of the people. Kumm thinks that "the rhetoric of "the people themselves" sabotages clear thinking" 53 , but if one concedes that representative democracy is the best version of democratic legitimacy 54 , then this argument looses much of its theoretical grip. Here lies the ratio of pluralism in Kumm"s version:
on the conceptual level, constitutional pluralism allows basic commitments of liberal democracy to be articulated in a way that divorces them from the Hobbesian statist conceptual framework in which they originally had to fit. It allows us to reconceive legitimate authority and institutional practices in a way that makes without the ideas of the state, of sovereignty, of ultimate authority, and of "we the people" as basic foundations of law and the reconstruction of legal practice 55 .
The reference to a concrete collective sovereign would shift the locus of legitimacy from reason to collective will, a move highly dangerous for Kumm since, as noted earlier, it would reintroduce particularity in the constitutional system and this would taint the judges" ability to 51 perform proportionality analysis.
According to Kumm, the authentic institutionalisation of the practice of contestation has been realized by the contemporary European system of courts. This has been possible because of a series of propitious conditions, not available before World War II (and probably not even before the fall of the Wall). The point of this practice is aptly described by the author in these terms: "The most likely way that a citizen is ever going to change the outcomes of a national political process, is by going to court and claiming that his rights have been violated by public authorities" 56 . This is the gist of Kumm"s argument: courts constitute a more effective and viable channel for representing disagreement than the political process. In this way, contemporary European constitutionalism, after having learned its lessons from the disasters of the "short Century", protects itself from the return of nationalism, one of the worst evils generated by European history and by its modern metaphysics 57 .
Kumm"s approach is highly representative of a typical forma mentis of the European scholar, which understands constitutionalism in atomistic terms, leading to a legal environment which envisages as the only appropriate spaces of contestation and of claiming those represented by national and international courts. Coherently, rights are conceived as individual safeguards against the State and the focus of the constitutional theorist remains on the relationship between the individual and the State, or to put it in a more theoretical shape, between the individual fundamental rights and the policy promoted by a majority of citizens or politicians.
Once again, things are portrayed in this way because it is believed that the reasonableness of the arguments put forward by the legal authority and by the dissenters can be checked only by judicial reasoning through balancing. To put it shortly, this is a restatement of the idea that courts are forums of principles and political institutions forums of policies 58 . If one conceives rights as optimisation (and not maximization) requirements -as Kumm seems to do -then courts become the most effective locus for balancing between rights. Yet, it is telling that some of the test-cases to whom Kumm refers in developing a theory created in order to solve constitutional conflicts through judicial bodies, were finally resolved by the political process. In Ireland, the prohibition of abortion was saved at the Community level by adopting a special protocol exempting Ireland from certain 
The Institutionalist Version of Pluralism: Maduro's Contrapunctual Principles
Another body of work highly influential for constitutional pluralism has set the contribution of the ECJ in terms of "necessary cunningness" in the process of juridification of the EU. The socalled dual nature of supranationalism, that is, the idea that the integration process has been marked mainly by legal means and only marginally by political processes 60 , has now been challenged by different perspectives. Miguel Maduro, in order to avoid the risks federalists have outlined, has introduced meta-principles in order to regulate the relation between supranational and national courts. These principles are defined as "contrapunctual" and they aim at avoiding chaos and conflict Pluralism cannot be taken to its extreme consequences, otherwise it will collapse into something completely different, giving way to anarchy and to the manipulation of the legal order by the most powerful. For this reason, by introducing contrapunctual principles, Maduro certainly wants to limit pluralism in a significant way. In this sense, he presents his theory not as a radical, but a more modest version of pluralism 61 . Interestingly enough, the principles he puts forward are addressed first of all to courts (national and European).
The first principle to which courts should subscribe is pluralism itself:
60 It is interesting to note that the idea of the ECJ"s necessary cunningness has been adapted outside a pluralist framework by Julio Baquero Cruz, Between Competition and Free Movement: The Economic Constitutional Law of the European Community, Oxford, Hart, 2002. Cruz resorts to John Ely"s theory of judicial review as protecting democracy from its weaknesses for explaining how the Court sought to correct for national representational deficiencies or to relieve supranational decisions amidst the complexly overlapping layers of governance. In that respect, Cruz is clearly moving beyond pluralism, advocating a strong form of European constitutionalism. 61 Maduro makes it clear in Four Visions of Constitutional Pluralism, cit., p. 344. On the idea that Maduro"s theory is not truly pluralist see the remarks made by M. Avbelj, Questioning EU Constitutionalisms, cit., p. 19.
any legal order (national or European) must respect the identity of the other legal orders; its identity must not be affirmed in a manner that either challenges the identity of the other legal orders or the pluralist conception of the European legal order itself 62 .
In other words, no court should affirm the supremacy of its legal order. This principle is intended to foster two values. First of all, it should protect national identity and the related idea that self-determination is fundamental in the formation of this identity. In the European context, the respect of national identity poses the problem of co-existence between different identities. The recognition of the value of self-determination 63 entails an attitude of respect between the European and the national level. This mutual recognition implies the acceptance of the existence of EU law on the one side, the respect for the claims of national constitutions on the other. The second value fostered by the idea of pluralism is participation. For Maduro, pluralism should be constructed in such a way as to promote the broadest participation possible. Leaving the construction of a pluralist legal order to courts means promoting the participation of certain subjects (those who can afford the transaction costs involved in EU law litigation). Litigants in EU case law "often coincide with multi-national companies and are supported by cross-national legal strategies while, for example, national court involvement in this litigation does not benefit from the same cross-national perspective or coordination" 64 . Also, the dialogue between national courts and the ECJ tends to develop along separate national lines, raising the question of the uneven impact of different constitutional courts on the European dialogue. Maduro seems to admit that pluralism goes hand in hand with a certain conception of institutional (or more accurately, judicial) equality. Otherwise, pluralism in itself would never be able to yield a true European legal discourse. The third principle states that courts should seek consistency and vertical and horizontal coherence in the whole of the European legal order. Maduro notes that "(w)hen national courts apply EU law they must do so in a manner as to make those decisions fit the decisions taken by the ECJ but also by other national courts" 65 . Evidently, the same rule applies to the ECJ, which should take other courts" decisions seriously. According to the third principle, "any judicial body (national or European) should be obliged to reason and justify its decisions in the context of a coherent and integrated European legal 62 M. Maduro, Contrapunctual Law, cit., p. 526. 63 On this topic see the classic article of J. Raz, A. Margalit, "National Self-Determination", Journal of Philosophy, is in relation to courts that he highlights what might be called "institutionalist awareness": courts must increasingly be aware that they don"t have a monopoly over rules and that they often conflict with other institutions in their interpretation. They have to accept that the protection of the fundamental values of their legal order may be better achieved by another institution or that the respect owed to the identity of another legal order should lead them to defer to that jurisdiction.
This requires courts to both develop instruments for institutional comparison and to set limits for jurisdictional deference at the level of systemic identity 81 .
It is the courts" specific role that bestows on them the responsibility of being at the institutional crossroads of several legal interactions. But why this institutional awareness should be The role of courts in the tracking of common goods is obtained by serving individual rights which by being served consolidate the value of common goods. But if one assumes that the content of common goods, despite the fact that it is the product of a wider consensus, is open to discussion and debatable, even after a decision on it has already been taken, then Raz"s position seems to be partial. It reproduces certain stereotypes on the difference between democratic processes as concerned on short-term interests and judicial activity concerned mainly with the protection of fundamental rights 87 . The politics of the common good, in a pluralist environment, should be represented at several levels by different institutions, each one putting forward a conception of the common good from a specific (representative) point of view.
Therefore, the lack of a reflection on the role of political institutions in the tracking of common goods casts a shadow on the ability of constitutional pluralism to provide for the values previously mentioned. Indeed, this view strikes as inaccurate both at a descriptive and at a normative level. On the first level, this institutional blindness 88 is probably due to the fact that there is a tendency in Europe to conflate legal reasoning with judicial reasoning 89 . The European Arrest
Warrant saga represents a good example of a practice understandable in pluralist terms, even though the lesson one might draw from it remains far from univocal 90 . But in order to explain the dynamics behind this saga, one should not limit its account to the dialogue between the courts involved in the case. Mangold 91 , a case concerning discrimination on the ground of age, constitutes another example which might prove the necessity for an enlarged institutional view. In this case, the ECJ, leaving aside its case law on horizontal effect and temporary effects of Directives, recognized a new general principle of non discrimination on the basis of age 92 . This led to declare the incompatibility of a German law allegedly intended to introduce fixed-term contracts for employers older than 52 in order to facilitate their integration in the job market. Unsurprisingly, this decision was received with which will soon come to an end with a decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. In the meantime, the ECJ seems to have overruled its own position as a reaction to the German political backlash. In On a normative level, to account for an encompassing view on the possible institutional dialogues in Europe would have represented a first step toward a constitutional theory which allows for more voices to be heard, more perspectives from which to learn and more sites of possible constitutional resistance. The tracking of the European public interest, as complicated as it certainly is, might also benefit from a more, say, pluralist understanding of the separation of powers between different layers. This separation may also represent the first step in the setting of normative criteria for solving conflicts between different interests underpinning the relation between European and national layers.
Palacios de las Casas and in
All this happens, also, in an under-theorized legal context which hardly will change any time which a third of all votes have been allotted have sent such a reasoned opinion, then the draft must be reviewed. The draft can then be maintained, amended or withdrawn and reasons must be given for this decision. The parliaments" veto is not binding, and the scope of this tool is limited, one might be reminded, to subsidiarity arguments, not proportionality. However, the aim of this provision is to create a framework of cooperation between the Commission, the Council and national parliaments in order to produce a written record of reasons so that the ECJ can assess them if asked to do so in litigation. But what is most interesting from a pluralist perspective is that parliaments are not recognized legal standing and therefore cannot bring subsidiarity issues to the ECJ. Only the government of the Member State could bring action on parliament"s behalf 95 . This means that there won"t be any direct channel of communication between the ECJ and national parliaments. Of course, it is far from being clear that a political question needs to be taken to court 96 (but then, one wonders whether this argument can be valid for every subsidiarity issue) and it is questionable to refer to national parliaments as a collective entity while it is clear that there are huge differences among legislatures across Europe 97 . Moreover, in the absence of a lasting practice, it is difficult to assess the impact of these provisions on subsidiarity.
As it happens in other constitutional experiences, a dialogue, or sometimes, a conflict between institutions belonging to different constitutional layers of the polity may help both spark a debate on the meaning of certain constitutional features and on the application and interpretation of fundamental rights 98 . Obviously, the single-institutional approach advocated by some constitutional pluralists is constrained by certain legal rules (like the preliminary reference rule) which shape the institutional interactions between institutions at the European level. But the assumptions of the pluralists" approach do not rule out completely the possibility to enlarge the scope of these interactions in order to include other perspectives. Indeed, one can already find traces of this possible enlarged view 99 101 .
In conclusion, one of the possible ways to track down European common goods lies, once again, in the interplay between representative institutions and the principle of separation of powers, even when this problem is tackled with in a multilayered polity as the Europe Union is supposed to be. Constitutional pluralism indicates an interesting route that might be followed to arrive at a better formulation for a European politics of the common good. However, it represents only a first step that needs to be supplemented, firstly, by more attention to input reasons as provided by political processes and, secondly, to a thicker pluralist interplay between different powers and institutions.
